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ABSTRACT 
 
The reform of corporate governance is again on the agenda in the wake of Enron and 
excessive risk-taking by financial institutions. However, the search for new and better 
forms of governance often seems to lack guiding principles. A theory of corporate 
governance ought to emerge from a theory of the firm. Yet, the literature shows how 
this project is both difficult and far from complete. In this paper we review how 
existing theory provides a variety of arguments favouring either a shareholder or a 
stakeholder orientation. These arguments may depend on whether the prime objective 
for governance is improved current performance or a more long-term focus for firms. 
A brief review of recent US governance reforms is given as a backdrop to discussing 
more far-reaching proposals that have emerged in the recent literature; a greater role 
for institutional investors on the one hand or a return to managerial capitalism on the 
other. 
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VARIETIES OF GOVERNANCE 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
Like many topics in economics, that of corporate governance rests on axioms and 
assumptions that are rarely debated and that are not always even articulated. 
Arguably, the position with respect to corporate governance is more extreme than 
most because the relevant theory is often taken to be that of the nature and boundary 
of the firm, which is both fragmented and controversial (Winter 1993). 
 
In this paper we are concerned with the relative merits of stakeholder or shareholder 
orientation and on what the literature has to say on this. In much of the economics 
literature there tends to be a default position of shareholder value. Nevertheless, 
optimal governance orientation can not easily be read off from a traditional theory of 
the firm (Blair 1995 , Zingales 2000, Tirole 2001). 1  One objective of this paper is to 
review the theoretical rationale offered for different forms of governance and also to 
show how varieties of governance involve different trade-offs. Section 2 discusses 
governance systems from the perspective of the firm’s current performance, while 
section 3 mirrors that comparison in relation to the firm’s appetite for forward 
commitments. As far as governance is concerned, the latter issue has been the dog that 
didn’t bark, but there is now renewed interest in the adequacy of innovation, 
infrastructure and other capital investments (Christensen et al 2008). Section 4 
suggests that reforms to the US system of governance over the last few decades have 
been aimed mainly at current performance. Section 5 compares two rival systems of 
governance reform from the perspective of forward commitments. Section 6 
concludes.  
 
 
                                                 
1 For an overview of governance systems see Blair and Roe (eds 1999) and Kelly , Kelly and Gamble 
(eds 1997). The relation of governance to the varieties of capitalism debate is discussed in Hall and 
Soskice (1995); see also its critique by Pontusson (2005). 
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We begin with a methodological question. Suppose that we could represent models of 
governance that are more or less shareholder, or stakeholder oriented in the sense that 
control rights rest largely with one of these polarities; what criteria would be 
appropriate in choosing between them?  The literature tends to focus on the efficiency 
and distribution properties of the systems. By “distribution” is meant, in the case of 
shareholder orientation, the issues concerned with danger of expropriation, conflict 
between minor and major shareholders, or between holders of debt and equity (See, 
for example Shleifer and Vishny 1997). For stakeholder models, the distribution 
interest is in how implicit contracts may be broken and weaker parties defrauded 
(Shleifer and Summers 1988). Nevertheless, no matter how important these 
distribution issues may be in their own right, they are generally subordinated in the 
literature to a consideration of efficiency. Thus, shareholder rights are seen as 
important to ensure finance on good terms; implicit contracts are important for 
ensuring stakeholder commitment etc. In our review of the literature we will capture 
the main debates by focusing on how efficiency is served by governance.  
 
Governance influences costs and benefits that markets cannot mediate, partly because 
not all uncertain effects can be contracted for (incomplete contracts) and/or because 
information asymmetries create moral hazard or adverse selection. Governance thus 
corresponds to a broad system of incentive provision, that being interpreted to include 
arbitration procedures in respect of non-contracted claims and externalities. Incentives 
can be changed in a variety of ways, including full integration, profit sharing, and 
other forms of organisational design such as a change of arbitration rules. Importantly, 
incentives relate to both current performance and forward commitments. The former 
relates to questions of productive efficiency such as effort and compensation of 
employees (shirking, private benefits etc). The latter relates more to the split between 
dividends (or share buy backs) and internal investments (capital investment, training, 
marketing, innovation etc), with increasing commitment generally associated with 
higher total risk. We may characterise the existing discourses on these issues in the 
array shown in Table 1 where the cells are set up to represent an ordering in 
importance that is suggested by the weight of the associated literature. 
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Table 1   
Importance Of Efficiency Objectives By Governance Type: the literature perspective  
 
Efficiency Objective↓ Shareholder orientation Stakeholder orientation 
Current performance Important  [662] Important  [621] 
Forward commitments Relatively unimportant [80] Relatively important  [214]
 
 
 
 How true is such a representation of ordering? The square bracketed numbers 
represent the number of articles recorded in a Web of Science topic search that 
arguably correspond to the cells, supporting the idea that shareholder oriented systems 
are viewed primarily as bearing on current performance; more so than stakeholder 
systems.  Certainly the question of forward commitments seems a relatively neglected 
topic in the shareholder oriented literature.2 In the following two sections we aim to 
collate the efficiency arguments supporting each of the governance forms in respect of 
current performance and forward commitment. 
 
2. CURRENT PERFORMANCE: THE ISSUES 
 
Governance is often exemplified as a chosen level of integration for the firm e.g. a 
choice between organising production with employees or self-contracting suppliers, or 
some intermediate arrangement. The principles governing the choice of integration 
depend on what is held constant under integration. In some models the level of 
information is unchanged but implied incentives are changed because of different 
allocation of control rights (Hart 1993). Alternatively the level of integration might be 
chosen because it corresponds to an advantage in information or process (Williamson 
1993). In any event, the decision is resolved by some trade-off between the potential 
deviations from first best that governance generally implies.3  A number of theories 
                                                 
2 Clockwise from the top left the cells represent for the Web of Science search 1980-2008, the 
combinations (Shareholder NOT stakeholder AND Performance); (Stakeholder NOT shareholder AND 
performance); (Shareholder NOT stakeholder AND Innovation); (Stakeholder NOT shareholder AND 
Innovation). Stakeholding and Shareholding were also included as alternative terms in each case. The 
term innovation was chosen rather than investment because the latter may represent financial 
investment. 
3 Hart (1993, section 4.1) provides an example where under asymmetric information with no 
externalities, the person who determines the profitability of an asset should fully own it, though the 
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show the advantages of designing organisational boundaries and routines to reflect the 
market failures and externalities that would otherwise affect performance more 
negatively. There is a large literature on all these questions, a good starting point 
being Holmstrom and Tirole (1989), Williamson and Winter (eds 1993), Holmstrom 
and Roberts (1998) and Roberts (2004). 
 
The issue of integration and the boundary of the firm is sometimes seen as a parable 
for broader governance problems such as the rules for resolving ex-post conflict with 
suppliers of labour or finance (Williamson 2002, p.182). Seen in this broad 
perspective, shareholder and stakeholder governance forms may affect the firm’s 
current performance differently.  Some distinctions are summarised in Table 2 and 
discussed in the subsequent text. 
 
TABLE 2 
Governance influences on  Current Performance 
Theoretical view:- Importance of 
Governance relates to: ↓ 
Shareholder or Stakeholder 
orientation supported? 
2.1 Principal-Agent theory with 
shirking under information asymmetry
Hybrid case.  
2.2 Adaptation to contingencies Depends on relative monitoring costs 
or relative coordination costs 
 
2.1 Principal Agent 
Costly monitoring of behaviour by agents affects the alignment of reward with effort 
and thus effort itself. Agents (typically managers) engage in efforts that are difficult to 
evaluate due to stochastic environments and produce outputs that are unverifiable 
because of team production.  If performance is very sensitive to one party’s input and 
high monitoring cost makes opportunism pay, then one solution is for the monitored 
party to obtain ownership. It could be said that the stakeholder becomes a shareholder 
so that the system is hybrid. The solution is modified when objective characteristics 
(poor access to capital, say) limit such ownership change: it is then the capital 
structure that the defines the governance form.  A solution may also emerge where 
incentives are altered by ownership rights being transferred by the principal, as under 
profit sharing schemes. 
                                                                                                                                            
particular example is so stark that it allows a first best solution. Rajan and Zingales (1998) derive a 
variety of complex models with diverse results along the same lines. 
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2.2 Adaptation  
The allocation of control rights does not always have to go with “ownership”4.  This 
issue is addressed in “adaptation theory”. The context is where the parties involved in 
joint enterprise e.g. workers and financiers agree ex-ante on decision rules for residual 
control. It is simple and instructive to formalise this. Following Simon (1951) and its 
development in Gibbons (2005) we write the expected total surplus (TS), where the 
decision rule is given to party i as: 
 
))}(,())(,({ 21 sdsUsdsUETS iisdd i +==      ……………(1) 
where s is the state of nature, id the decision of party i; U is the pay-off to each player 
and E is the expectation operator.  
  
The specification shows both how realised total surplus depend on the decision rule 
(allocation of residual control, the i in  the id  ). This could occur because of different 
capabilities of the parties; because of objective circumstances such as coordination 
costs or monitoring costs that are implied by a particular party having control rights; 
or in a more complex setting where the incentives of a player to invest for the future 
depends on who holds decision rights (See Section 3).   
 
The adaptation context can be illustrated where monitoring cost depends on the form 
of governance, making asymmetric information less problematic in some contexts. 
For example, monitoring costs might be low for a small number of cooperating agents 
whereas the reverse might apply for a principal and a large set of contracted 
employees, though there is no consensus on this dependence in the literature 
(Holmstrom and Tirole 1989,  Holmstrom and Roberts 1998).  
 
Besides differential monitoring costs, the degree of opportunism (and thus the need 
for monitoring) may perhaps be determined by the governance form and managerial 
                                                 
4 For Hart (1995) the separation of  residual control rights (the right to determine uncontracted 
decisions) and residual (i.e. non-contractual) income generates perverse incentive effects  because the 
holder of control rights is then not incentivised to maximise income and thus it “… makes sense to 
allocate these rights to the same person” (p.65). This does not address the problem of  multiple 
recipients of residual income. 
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culture (Kreps 1990, Stout and Blair 2001, Roberts 2004). The issue is complex 
because although control rights for stakeholders may reduce shirking it may also 
make it more feasible to misappropriate benefits (Hellwig 1998). Some argue that 
there is a hidden cost to insider (stakeholder) monitoring:  “…the result could be a 
rent-dissipating struggle for stakeholders to “dispossess each other” (Rajan and 
Zingales 1998 p.424; see also Lazonick 1992, Hansmann 1996, and Jensen 2001). 
What seems clear from all this is that the organisational culture may change with a 
change in governance form and that this may be just as important as the direct effect 
of incentives. 
2.3 Assessment regarding current performance 
Summing up the arguments for shareholder or stakeholder orientation from the 
perspective of current performance it seems that many of the major issues are still to 
be resolved. The theories are complex and non-nested and the empirics are 
fragmented. Formal incentive theory has little to say about the stakeholder-
shareholder orientation but may predict where profit-sharing is likely to be observed. 
In adaptation theory on the other hand, governance choice reduces to the question of 
who best exercises control rights.  Hansmann (1996) provides a set of case studies 
where allocation of control rights to different groups may be efficient in different 
circumstances depending particularly on the cost of coordination. Rock and Wachter 
(1999) argue that workers and capitalists generally do both participate in governance 
according to their objective circumstances. What is missing is a programmatic 
empirical study of a dynamic nature that investigates what happens when governance 
changes.5 That  is particularly important because so much of the disputed territory 
concerns what is appropriate to hold constant when comparing forms of governance. 
The answer may of course be elusive because governance change may be endogenous 
and depend on evolving characteristics such as technological regime and the 
importance of intangibles. 
 
                                                 
5 See Blair and Roe (1999), Pendleton (2001), Michie and Sheehan (2001), Cook et al (2002) for some 
work along these lines. 
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3. FORWARD COMMITMENTS: THE ISSUES 
 
Arguably, it is in relation to sustained performance - and the forward commitments 
that create the opportunities for this -  that the sharpest differences arise between the 
shareholder and stakeholder views. We will summarise the results of some of the 
literature by annotating the results table below that shows the conditions under which 
different governance forms may be superior in creating incentives for forward 
commitments. 
 
Table 3  
Influences on forward commitments according to governance orientation in different 
theories 
Theoretical view: Importance of 
Governance relates to: ↓ 
Shareholder or Stakeholder orientation 
supported? 
3.1 Asset specificity  Depends on whether the shareholder is a sole 
residual claimant bearing all risk 
3.2 Adaptation  Depends on who is best placed to bear risk, create 
reputations etc  
Depends on bargaining strengths i.e. credible 
threats to withhold finance, human capital etc. 
 
3.3 Biased time horizon for      
investments                               
Depends on liquidity preference of investors and on 
whether financial market arbitrage is strong enough 
to counter short-termism.  
 
 
3.1 Asset specificity 
The first set of issues (top row of Table 3) originates in the property rights treatment 
of the boundary of the firm problem under incomplete contracts. Assuming that 
ownership implies control rights, a decision on the level of integration may permit the 
internalising of the incentive problem or “hold-up” caused by asset specificity 
(relational investment).  For example, a firm may refuse to invest enough because the 
resultant sunk cost would make it vulnerable (Hart 1995).  In that case, the 
coordination problem is potentially solvable by a change of ownership (merger) and 
thus bargaining power, so that the threatened underinvestment is avoided.6 
                                                 
6 The relevance of the theory is controversial outside of the regulatory sphere. Holmstrom and Roberts 
(1998) say that “hold-up problems are of central concern to business people” (p.80) and the idea is 
central to much recent theory on incentives to innovate (Gambadella 2008). However, others argue that 
the focus on hold-up may be at the expense of more important aspects of coordination (Foss 2000) and 
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The basic argument can, however be remoulded in a surprising way by a 
consideration of human capital. Although residual income is often thought as accruing 
only to shareholders, this is not so if other parties receive a portion of remuneration in 
the form of non-contractual risk-based income. Since this is inevitably the case under 
limited liability (and where tax-payers, debt-holders, specialised suppliers, workers 
with firm-specific skills, and recipients of efficiency wages all tend to share in the  
risk of failure), it is arguable that control rights should also be shared on efficiency 
grounds. This is one basis for the stakeholding view (Blair 1995; Driver and 
Thompson 2002; Asher et al 2005). One of the implications of shareholder orientation 
in this way of thinking is that owners of human capital will have an incentive to bias 
their training towards generic skills so as to increase their outside option. A tendency 
towards underinvestment in firm-specific human capital is thus implied by 
shareholder orientation in the property rights view (Zingales 2000).7 It may be noted 
that the theory does not address generic skill formation but only firm-specific skill 
investments. Since much of that skill formation may be directed by the firm rather 
than a subject of individual choice, it is thus the unmonitored effort or commitment of 
energy and risk to the firm’s projects that is in question. While it might be argued that 
such commitment could be ensured by appropriate incentives, the issue then shades 
into one of monitoring effort where communication and cooperation is central to the 
work process. The resolution of this may have less to do with asset specificity per se, 
than with the complexity of the environment, so that governance needs to be 
responsive to technological and organisational trajectories. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
indeed Hart also seems to accept this (Hart 1995 p.88). Lyons (1996) is one of very few empirical 
studies of the effect of hold-up on investment, finding just a small difference in the responses of firms 
who would use a first-best specialised asset under long-term contracts as compared to those who were 
currently using it with short-term contracts. More disturbingly, it now appears that the eponymous 
Fisher-GM case was based on a mis-reading of the facts. In a savage indictment of theoretical 
economics, Ronald Coase (2006) excoriates those who disregarded inconvenient facts to push a false 
account of the incentive problem faced by Fisher bodies in choosing plant locations. Williamson (2002) 
is surely wrong to argue that the anecdote was simply pedagogical. As Coase shows, the facts support 
the prevalence of trust relationships rather than opportunism in that case. 
  
7 Zingales (2000) notes that while the property rights view of corporate governance appears “logically 
to imply a Marxian position of worker control”, he is “not aware of any corporate governance paper 
arguing along these lines” (p.1639). See, however Blair (1995); Hart (1996); Becht et al (2003); and 
Asher et al (2005) where the point is acknowledged in various ways.   
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3.2 Adaptation  
As seen in Section 2, adaptation theory places more emphasis on the outcome of 
incomplete contracts being resolved by authority than bargaining (Williamson 2002, 
p.188). Indeed, this might thought to be logical since the uncertainty associated with 
incomplete contracts may imply bounded rationality which is at variance with much 
of the property rights literature. Whereas the logical sequence in the property rights 
view is governance→ anticipated bargaining strength→ incentives, the adaptation 
sequence is structural characteristics → governance→ incentives. Structural 
characteristics relate to the objective position of the parties (including bargaining 
strengths) that determine their suitability for governance. The important question is 
then in which party should authority be vested for good governance? Here we are 
asking this question from the standpoint of forward commitments. 
 
Table 3, row 2 notes that one criterion may be related to who is best placed to bear 
risk. An argument along these lines in support of shareholder orientation is due to 
Rajan and Zingales (1998). Here the focus is on whether a manager has an incentive 
to increase the extent of specialisation, and thus incur more risk. In contrast to the 
apparent implications of the property rights approach, as interpreted by stakeholder 
theorists such as Blair (1995), residual rights of control should, according to this 
argument, belong to agents who have little control over the extent of specialisation 
because specialisation is held to reduce the value of the asset in alternative use. This is 
said to support shareholder control on the grounds that shareholders have nothing to 
lose by specialisation.8 Were residual control rights to be granted to managers 
(solving one incentive problem), it would reduce their incentive to further specialise 
the firm because, should they quit the firm, their specialised human capital would lose 
value. It could be said that Rajan and Zingales have discovered independently the 
argument in Hart (1993), echoed in Gibbons (2005), that the solution to every hold-up 
problem creates another. 
 
                                                 
8  These authors argue that human and non-human capital can be considered as a source of  power and 
thus that the property rights view of the firm needs to be replaced  for high human capital firms by a 
theory of  “access” to complementary factors. While the theory challenges the case for stakeholder 
control it is not an argument for a shareholder value theory of the firm because the authors note that 
residual income accrues to stakeholders. 
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This, then, is an important argument that concerns the limits to risk-bearing by 
managers and other employees. While they are obliged to share some risk they can 
offset it by diversifying their human capital investments and by containing the firm’s 
overall risk exposure. It is plausible that senior managers and employees may have 
already concentrated their assets in the firm and to commit further investment to the 
firm rather than raise payouts may be unattractive due to risk aversion. Shareholders 
having more diversified wealth may be less concerned with this, so that the constraint 
on investment is internal rather than external and the risk profile of the firm is biased 
away from a first best case. It is of course hard to prove this, though a necessary 
condition is that risk-taking increases with shareholder orientation and there is some 
evidence for that. Following demutualisation of the UK building societies in the 
1980s, investor-owned funds made riskier, higher-return investments than the mutuals 
(Cook et al 2002). Also, hostile takeovers have been found to be related to the degree 
to which shareholder rights take precedence in the prevailing legal and institutional 
framework, i.e. insiders tend to oppose such moves (Schnepper and Guillen 2004). 
However while risk-taking may rise under shareholder orientation, that does not mean 
that it is optimal. Nor does it even imply that the risk-return trade-off becomes more 
attractive, because cooperative risk-sharing and the quality of information flows may 
also be affected by the form of governance. The available evidence appears to suggest 
that insider systems such as in Germany facilitate better inter-firm cooperation and 
information sharing than shareholder-oriented systems and that may lead to a 
spreading of risk (Love and Roper 2004). 9  
 
We turn next to the issue of reputation and to the question of which party is best 
placed to hold title to this. Adaptation theory is intimately related to “implicit 
contracts” that can be thought of as contingent payments that are offered in normal 
circumstances but which can be suspended, at some cost in reputation, by the exercise 
of authority (Demsetz 1993).   Examples are work-place norms in relation to work-
                                                 
9 Extending the above argument it is sometimes argued that governance involves a “horses for courses” 
approach to risk with insider systems more appropriate where cooperative incremental innovation is the 
norm and shareholder control when the environment is rapidly changing with radical uncertainty (Hall 
and Soskice 2001). Some have argued that stakeholder economies such as Germany have trouble in 
diversifying into radical new areas such as biotechnology (Casper 1999; see also Carlin and Mayer 
2003, p193-4). But the result is contested in  Kaiser and Prange (2004). For further discussion see 
Ramirez and Tylecote (2004) and Tylecote 2007. 
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intensity or the degree of protection for a firm’s pension fund.  These relational 
contracts are in effect informal allocations of residual income (generally to 
employees) in exchange for residual control rights (generally to owners). They require 
a dynamic analysis because the strength of the informal contract depends on trust or 
reputation built up over time.10 (Kreps 1990, Baker et al 2004).   
 
In regard to the specific question of how reputation relates to the form of governance,  
Holmstrom and Tirole (1989) comment that parties with significant interest invested 
in acquiring a reputation should typically be given residual decision rights. This will 
ensure that “the potential loss of reputation will assure a more efficient and fair 
adjudication process in the event of the unforeseen” (p.77). The argument may, 
however, be circular since reputation is achieved through not abusing control rights 
and invested interest in it is, therefore, potentially endogenous to the consideration of 
who should hold such rights.  
 
Finally, the bargaining strengths of the parties is another element in the adaptation 
theory argument (Table 2 row 2). The form of governance may depend on bargaining 
power because the exercise of governance requires authority. Whereas in the property 
rights approach, bargaining power is endogenous, here it is taken to be characteristic 
of the supplier of factors.  A formal justification of shareholder orientation along these 
lines is the “pledgeable income theory” due to Tirole (2001). 11 This theory, 
elaborated in the Appendix, is a Rawls -type argument that an ex-ante agreement, that 
includes a probability of a reneged implicit contract, is better than no contract at all. 
Specifically, suppliers of finance need to be confident that they will be allowed to 
pursue non-pareto optimal actions to secure their own interests, because otherwise 
                                                 
10 Treatments of reputation typically employ repeated game theory to show that reputation is valuable 
for improving performance. The result is similar to oligopoly “tit for tat” models where the extreme 
conclusions of the prisoners’ dilemma game are modified in repeated play (Kreps 1990). 
11 Tirole takes seriously the derivation of first-principle arguments for the allocation of control rights. 
Recognising the problematic interpretation of ownership, he argues for a broad definition of 
governance as the “design of institutions that induce or force management to internalise the welfare of 
stakeholders” (p.4). Contrast with the more neutral definition in Zingales (1998) given as “the complex 
set of constraints that shape the ex post bargaining over the quasi rents generated by a firm” (p.498) 
which is nevertheless broader than some definitions which see corporate governance as merely a 
principal-agent problem. 
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they will at the margin provide less finance.12 This argument is said to justify residual 
control rights for shareholders. 
3.3 Biased time horizons and the incentive to commit  
In the presence of asymmetric information it is difficult to frame incentives for 
forward commitments to ensure that expected returns are equal to the marginal cost of 
funds. The design of optimal investment rules such as company or division hurdle 
rates under imperfect information often implies a second-best solution (Holmstrom 
and Tirole 1989, Taggart 1987, Harris and Raviv 1996, Wulf 2002). Given such 
difficulties, a number of models predict capital rationing either inside the firm among 
its divisions or, in a principal-agent context where owners do the rationing as they 
cannot verify why managers are seeking funds. (Holmstrong and Roberts 1998).  
 
 A related but distinct problem is short-termism which again can be manifested within 
the firm or by the providers of finance. The latter problem arises partly due to the 
need to monitor fund managers, whose performance is evaluated often on a quarterly 
basis. Within the firm, short-termism can be caused by behavioural bias such as that 
arising from managerial game playing, especially in the context of short job tenures.  
A combination of heightened incentives and increased managerial turnover may 
induce managerial short-termism as rational response (Palley 1997).  
 
While many second-best outcomes are inevitable corollaries of imperfect information, 
the incidence of short-termism arguably relates more directly to the form of 
governance. Dispersed ownership is attractive to owners due to enhanced liquidity of 
shareholdings. The downside is the mirror image of liquidity viz. a lack of 
commitment on behalf of the owner who can sell up at short notice. This may create a 
“free-rider” problem where there is less monitoring than under insider governance. It 
may also bias commitments towards those with fastest paybacks (Miles 1993, Peck 
and Temple 1999, Gracia 2004) . 
                                                 
12  Earlier justifications for shareholder control rights include the idea that the objective position of this 
party is different due to information concerns: shareholder assets are “most susceptible to 
misappropriation” and may therefore be undersupplied so that  “capital should hold title to the residual 
return stream”  Holmstrom and Tirole (1989p.73). A parallel argument is that, although shareholders 
rewards (such as dividends) are generally transparent , it is easier to disguise other distributions such as 
worker rents and customer sweeteners (Tirole, p.28). 
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3.4  Assessment: Future Commitments   
In section 3.1.  we reviewed the position of Blair (1995) who argues for a stakeholder 
perspective as the logical corollary to the property rights view of governance. This 
argument is an important corrective to those who take shareholder rights as axiomatic. 
However, in my view, this argument offers only partial support for a stakeholder 
framework because the property rights approach in general may not be robust and as 
we have seen it is not the only defence of a shareholder orientation.  
 
In Section 3.2 we considered the adaptation view and here there is scope for serious 
comparison between the shareholder and stakeholder models. Adaptation theory needs 
to explain why the allocation of control rights to one or other party might indeed 
maximise total surplus or utility. A separate set of literature has sought to answer this 
in a number of distinct ways that variously support either the shareholder or 
stakeholder perspective. 
 
In reviewing the adaptation theory arguments we have noted potential effects from 
risk position, reputation and bargaining power. An important argument was that an 
aversion to risk on behalf of (undiversified) workers and managers may limit the 
appeal of stakeholding, though that could be countered to some extent by the role of 
cooperation in mediating risk.13 Ambivalence extends to the other issues. The 
question as to which party should have responsibility for the firm’s reputation is not 
resolved. Finally, in terms of bargaining power, Tirole’s “pledgeable income” 
argument would not appear be general. Rather, this argument depends on the 
existence of “finance gaps” making its scope contingent on details such as size, 
country and sector. 14 
 
Summarising the more robust arguments from adaptation theory we can say that a 
shareholder orientation is supported when equity finance constraints exist and where 
                                                 
13 We have not sought to complicate the matter further by considering the effect of different capital 
structures, implied by difference governance forms, on risk-taking, but if total risk matters that would 
be relevant. 
14 US equity capital raised has actually been negative for nearly 30 years (Clark ed. 2004). Indeed it has 
been shown for the US that share buy back announcements increase a company’s share price, 
suggesting an absence of financial constraint (Frank and Goyal 2005). Thus, if there is a constraint on 
innovation and investment it would appear to be internal rather than external. Overall, the situation is 
complex because recourse to equity may be endogenous under asymmetric information (Greenwald, 
Stiglitz and Weiss, 1984). 
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managers’ risk-aversion creates constraints on investment. A stakeholder orientation 
may be supported where cooperation and good internal information mediates risk.15 
 
In section 3.3 we reviewed the issues of imperfect information that results in both 
internal capital rationing and short-termism in response to outside pressure. While 
second-best outcomes are often implied by imperfect information - irrespective of the 
type of governance -  the intensity of short-termism is also arguably contingent on the 
form of governance. Short-termism can be considered a design fault of dispersed 
ownership because in that system liquidity is considered important to attract funds. 
The result is a free-rider problem in regard to monitoring agents’ behaviour as well as 
a predisposition to neglect long-term commitments. Empirical work has shown that 
short-run efficiency improvements are often made at the expense of growth (AT 
Kearney 1999; Mackenzie and Hodgson 2005) and that the vast majority of firms are 
prepared to sacrifice value to smooth short-term earnings (Graham et al 2005). 16 
 
Shareholder orientation may also encourage short-termism by facilitating a market in 
corporate control. The effects on forward commitments of such a market will depend 
on the balance between the incentives that are implied for managers. The available 
evidence suggests that hostile takeovers are not targeted at poorly performing firms 
(Franks and Mayer 1997), so it is unclear that they play an allocative efficiency role. 
The main role then of hostile takeovers may well be the behaviour that they induce in 
firms that are not taken over. Hostile takeovers are relatively rare even when they are 
in fashion (Becht et al 2003). Accordingly, it may not be the reality but the fear of 
takeovers that changes behaviour. It is this feature that explains why a serious role for 
takeovers in governance may imply short-term orientation by management, with 
forward commitments such as training and R&D sacrificed so as to maintain the 
                                                 
15 Faced with the choice, Tirole (2001) opts for a shareholder approach balanced by safeguards which 
include (i) circumscribing actions with strong negative externalities, presumably by legislation (ii) 
encouraging short-term or convertible debt to constrain shareholders from excessive risk-taking (iii) 
encouraging flexible labour markets to increase exit options for labour. These seem weak conclusions 
since some of the proposed actions eliminate other options.  For example, flexible labour markets are 
associated with lower incentives for the provision of company training, and debt discipline may prevent 
company managers from pursuing growth options. 
 
16 It might be thought that arbitrage should make short-termism irrelevant. However , theoretical work 
has shown how a short-term bias can persist without being countered by arbitraging investors (Morris 
1998, Peck and Temple 1999, Krafft and Ravix 2005).  
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current share prices (Bushee 1998, Peck and Temple 1999, Roberts 2001, Gracia 
2004). 
 
4. RECENT TRENDS IN GOVERNANCE: THE CASE OF THE US 
 
In sections 2 and 3 we reviewed how specific circumstances would favour shareholder 
or stakeholder orientations in respect of current performance and forward 
commitments. However, it is difficult to relate this theoretical account to the history 
and evolution of governance since there is no reason to believe in optimal 
evolutionary responses. Here we simply review the developments in governance in 
the major shareholder economy, the US, over recent decades in an attempt to interpret 
it in relation to the split between current performance and forward commitments 
illustrated in Table 1. The account will show how the US strengthened its orientation 
towards shareholder value throughout, in successive experimental episodes, 
influenced largely by a Principal-Agent view and the ideas in Section 2.1. A brief 
description of these episodes is followed by an assessment of effectiveness. 
4.1 Periodisation of shareholder value regimes 
In the US a decisive shift away from managerial capitalism -  where managers had a 
great deal of autonomy – occurred as US global economic advantage waned under a 
new wave of globalisation in the 1970s  (Chandler 1977). Financialisation, whereby 
financial institutions were de-regulated and acquired greater powers accelerated this 
process. But the increased influence for dispersed owners - that managerial capitalism 
had resolved by usurpation -  raised again the principal-agent problems that had been 
analysed in the 1930s (Berle 1965) and which remained to be dealt with under the 
new shareholder orientation. Several experiments followed and it is possible to 
identify at least three distinct shareholder value regimes over the last four decades.  
(i) Leveraged takeovers 
The first period, which roughly fits between the mid 1970s and late 1980s, saw an 
increase in hostile debt-financed takeover activity in the US due in part to the 
relaxation of legal constraints on institutional investment and to a benign view of debt 
as a discipline on opportunistic managers (Greenwald et al 1984, Jensen 1986, 1993;  
Blair 1995).   
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(ii) Incentives and alignment 
The second period (roughly the 1990s) was characterised by renewed pressure on 
managers, with performance related CEO turnover rising five times between 1995 and 
2000 (Gracia 2004). At the same time, shareholder value orientation was supported by 
designing incentives to align directly the interests of managers with those of owners, 
something made possible by organisations shedding layers of managers and 
concentrating power in the hands of a smaller managerial elite.  
(iii)Concentrated holdings  
This “post-Enron” period is one where legal requirements, such as auditor 
independence, were introduced at the same time as many companies paid more 
attention to board-room practices and design. This period is in many ways a 
continuum from the preceding one but now with increasing emphasis on incentives 
for boards of directors rather than managers, on concentrated or block ownership and, 
as an extreme example of the latter, private equity. 17 Put differently, this period is not 
only shareholder oriented but, at least to some extent, concerned with direct 
shareholder control or greater ease of indirect control via the election of directors. We 
consider a version of concentrated shareholder control as one way of reforming 
governance in Section 5.1   
4.2 Impact of shareholder value regimes 
Each of these regimes, while aiming to fix one problem, ended up exacerbating 
others. In the first regime, the problem addressed was current performance in the form 
of shirking by managers or workers. But fixing this with the sticks of a takeover threat 
or indebtedness focused attention away from investing for the future. By the end of 
this period questions were being asked about the international competitiveness of  US 
firms as import penetration increased from coordinated market economies that were 
devoting more resources to long-term investment and R&D. US Treasury Secretary 
Brady remarked that the takeover phenomenon had produced the opposite result to 
that intended by stoking a preoccupation with the short-term (Financial Times 
14/05/90). Subsequent to a spate of bankruptcies that ended this period, there 
followed a set of legal judgements and reform of US corporate law that made hostile 
                                                 
17 A greater reliance on voice rather than exit has been proposed in corporate governance literature for 
some time (Black 1997). The problem for regulators is to judge the extent to which concentrated 
holdings reduces the attractiveness of investment for more dispersed owners.  In the UK where, in 
comparison with the US, more  companies have one or more significant shareholders, the information 
disclosure requirements to all parties is stronger than in the US.  
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takeovers more difficult, arguably amounting to a partial retreat from shareholder 
orientation (Blair 1995).   
 
The second period swapped the stick for the carrot of formal incentives so as to align 
the interests of managers and shareholders. In theory this should have aligned both 
performance and investment incentives. However, the stock option form that was 
generally adopted  over-incentivised managers to perform in a way that inflated asset 
values. The result was complicated in terms of future commitments. On the one hand 
a real investment bubble was probably created in parallel with the dot-com boom , as 
with the earlier bubble in Japan (Chirinko  and Schaller 2001). On the other hand 
intangible future investments may have suffered in the downturn due to the breaking 
of implicit contracts, erosion of trust, proliferation of fraud, and the neglect of poorly 
valued investments necessary for future value creation. Overall the current verdict in 
the literature appears to be that incentives regime was not effective. 18  
 
The third episode involved increased recourse to block-holding and should in theory 
have injected a long-term focus.19  However, active hedge funds generally buy to 
trade rather than hold. Such activities may weaken the credit rating of the companies 
they invest in with problems for long-term investments.  It is true that some private 
equity investments, in particular those held directly by institutions may be aimed at 
providing long-term finance to firms with high growth prospects (Nielsen 2006) but 
this does not appear to be general. 20  
 
What stands out in the above characterisation of US governance over the recent past is 
how difficult it is for a shareholder oriented economy to adopt a culture of investing 
for the long run. The challenge for those who see the answer to good governance in 
                                                 
18 A meta picture is evaluated by Becht et al (2003) who conclude that”…  it has become difficult to 
maintain the view…that US pay practices provide ….incentives for aligning the interest of managers 
with those of shareholders” (p.79).  Some evidence is contradictory.  Wulf  and Lerner (2006) found 
that incentives increased innovation performance for firms with centralised R&D but not for those with 
decentralised R&D while noting that their research could not capture the effect of groundbreaking 
R&D which would take longer to show up as important.  
19 Overall, the verdict on block-holding seems mixed. Share value appears to increase with insider 
concentrated ownership, though liquidity may fall (Becht et al 2003 p.63). Some commentators have 
argued that the advantages of concentrated holdings for performance are industry-specific (Carlin and 
Mayer pp.193, 218) and the effects may also be non-linear. 
20 Indeed, even rating agency Moody’s has argued that private equity horizons are shorter than public 
companies (Financial Times, 9 July 2007).  
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the voice of institutional shareholders is to show that such governance can work to a 
horizon long enough to build trust, reputation and other strategic assets. These issues 
are discussed in the following section where two varieties of reform are contrasted 
based on some of the discriminators identified in Table 3. 21 
 
5 FUTURE PERSPECTIVES 
 
The pre-Enron reforms in the US are generally regarded to have failed while the  post-
Enron reforms are seen as fire-fighting that might not have prevented the problems 
(Gillan and Martin 2007).  This section is concerned with policy proposals for the 
future, drawing where relevant on  the theory surveyed in earlier sections. To contain 
the discussion we consider here just two alternatives to the dispersed shareholder 
system that prevails in Anglo-American economies. Each alternative is associated 
with a representative actor: the committed shareholder and the trustee manager. As the 
names imply the governance systems are located differently on the shareholder-
stakeholder spectrum. A brief pen-portrait of each follows. 
5.1 The committed (long-run) shareholder 
As noted earlier, the post-Enron period has been marked by greater calls for 
“relational” or committed shareholdings whereby voice complements exit in the 
governance of firms. One idea is for a small number of block shareholdings to 
constitute up to a third of the share value, thus “holding managers feet to the fire” 
(Elson 2007; see also Black 1997).   
 
It is, however, important not to equate block-holding with long-term pro-active 
investment strategies. At present these tend to be the preserve of individual contrarian 
investors, a small number of pension funds that emulate them, and possibly some 
sovereign funds. Proposals for extending the set of committed investors nearly always 
imply a reorientation of  institutional investors towards long-term commitment and 
involvement. Tylecote et al (2002) identify different current modes of institutional 
                                                 
21 Far from being resolved, the problem of short-termism is arguably increasing in importance in Anglo 
American economies, as suggested in recent comments and reports by the president of the UK 
employers’ organisation (CBI) and two US business groups: the Aspen group and the Donaldson 
group. See various issues of the Financial Times dated June 18; June 27 and additional comments in 
Stefan Stern’s column, FT March 28 2007. 
 20
investor activity including (i) passive and opportunistic trading and (ii)active 
involvement which may be pro-active or reactive (reversing the fortunes of a failing 
company where selling shares is difficult).22 The proactive mode takes “a view of 
personnel and strategy long before outsiders are in a position to do so and acts 
accordingly”.  
 
The case for proactive institutional involvement has been made by Hawley and 
Williams (2000, 2005), Aglietta and Reberieux (2005) and Aglietta (2007). The 
argument is that pension funds and other institutional investors have two distinct 
characteristics. The size of their holdings makes exit difficult while simultaneously 
internalising externalities that smaller holdings could avoid. Put differently because 
they are “owners of small parts of global capital” they have a need to “induce 
efficiency in the real economy” (Aglietta  2007 p.14). In the UK active institutional 
investment has been cautiously encouraged in a series of government reports (Myners 
2001; see also Aguilera et al 2006, Mallin et al 2005).  
 
There is as yet, no convincing evidence that activism by institutional investors such as 
pension funds seem to make a difference either to the economy or to private investors. 
Arguably the former failure is because a small part of global capital is not large 
enough to internalise externalities. And perhaps both failures are an indication that 
these funds themselves are poorly governed (Becht et al 2003 pp.64,69); indeed 
institutional investors are usually left outside the scope of corporate governance codes 
(Hertig  2005 p.273). Furthermore, they often farm out the management of their funds 
to agents with short-term incentives so that any specific advantage of concentrated 
holdings would not always be expected to occur. It should not be forgotten either that 
it was the rise of the institutional investor that sparked concern with short-termism in 
the UK in the 1980s (Walker 1985), nor that they pioneered stock-option incentives in 
the US. Furthermore, the average holding period for US institutional funds is only ten 
months (Christenson et al 2008). 
                                                 
22 More accurately, these authors suggest three separate modes including a distinct one where investors 
deal on the basis of fundamental analysis holding significant shares, but in large firms, so they are 
protected from lock-in; they do not seek control but simply to benefit from their superior information 
and analysis. The reactive active investor may have begun in this way but then left it too late to exit. An 
emergent fourth mode is also suggested with more briefing for institutional investors but with the latter 
still able to trade given that the information can be argued to be public, or where the analysis and 
trading functions of the investor unit are isolated from each other. 
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The “committed investor” reform therefore involves a complete transformation of 
institutional routines of decisionmaking. It is probably correct that any serious role for 
active institutional investors would have to be legislated for, given that an individual 
activist bears costs for gains that cannot be fully appropriated (Monks and Sykes 
2002).  
 
5.2 The trustee manager 
This representative agent is concerned to implement a form of managerial capitalism. 
Managerial capitalism is often seen as a bench-mark for long-run strategy. Alfred 
Chandler’s historical work cited earlier was later built on by scholars of the “resource 
based” theory of management strategy, to pursue the argument that capabilities 
matter. These capabilities built up over many years are distinct and non-reproducible 
and as such confer power and effectiveness on firms that markets (or collections of 
less integrated firms) cannot replicate. The matching of these inherited characteristics 
(intellectual property and its protection; complementary assets; brands and marketing 
strength; managerial routines; control of materials; reputation; and global reach) to the 
current environment becomes the object of strategy, so that strategy and structure co-
evolve.23 Because of its inherited capabilities, the firm is valued more than the sum of 
its assets, and it is hard to value how much the firm’s intangibles are worth. 
Managers, however have tacit knowledge that is neither codifiable nor fully 
communicable.  A shareholder-oriented approach is thus unreliable and is likely to 
neglect valid opportunities that are known but not credibly signalled by managers. 
Giving power and autonomy to managers is a controversial alternative that needs an 
understanding of managerial motivation (Hertig 2005, Crouch 2006). The trustee 
manager model has been made increasingly problematic, however, as a slimmed-
down layer of senior executives have effectively relinquished autonomy over 
decision-making in exchange for a remuneration system biased in their favour. 
 
                                                 
23 Chandler’s account, while more descriptive than theoretical, has now been developed and adopted as 
mainstream in business strategy education. See, for example, Nelson and Winter (1982); Kay  (1995); 
Hodgson (1998); Teece ( 2006). Williamson (1999, p.1094) characterises the “competence” perspective 
as fire-fighting trial and error rather than strategy but this seems a misrepresentation. Big bets and 
shaping strategies are part of the toolkit in this approach. 
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5.3 choosing between the long term investor and the trustee 
manager 
To what extent does the theory of governance for the long run, discussed in section 3 
permit us to discriminate between the merits of the committed investor and trustee 
manager models?  The discussion here is analysed through the lens of forward 
commitments and ordered under two sets of  familiar topics, discussed earlier. 
(i) Risk and Information 
Risk and information considerations were treated as interacting elements in the 
adaptation view in the discussion of Table 3. Shareholders are argued to be best 
placed for residual control because managers’ wealth is not sufficiently diversified to 
allow appropriate levels of risk-taking. Against that, stakeholder systems may lower 
vulnerability to risk due to cooperation and greater internal informational content. 
Thus, although much of the formal theory of governance suggests that it is insider 
systems of governance that discourage risk-taking,  much of the informal literature 
argues to the contrary? For example, managerial stakeholding is supported in 
Lazonick (1992) and O’ Sullivan (2000, 2004) because it is said to facilitate 
innovation:  
 
“…corporate governance must be concerned not only with allocating returns to those 
participants in the enterprise who are engaged in cumulative learning, but also with 
ensuring that, in the form of committed finance, control over returns  devolves to 
strategic decision makers who are and remain integrated into the processes of 
organizational learning.” (Lazonick 1992 p.41, our emphasis). 
 
 A similar case for the manager, as steward or trustee, has been made by proponents 
of the resource view of management such as Kay and Silberston (1995).24 What these 
accounts bring to the table is a characterisation of the firm as a repository of 
knowledge, both technical and strategic, which is not always codifiable or 
communicable beyond an inside group of involved agents. 
 
                                                 
24 In the approach of Kay and Silberston (1995), CEOs would be appointed for a four year period with 
total salary fixed in advance. As observed by Conyon and Peck (1998) the autonomy of the CEO would 
thus be greatly enhanced as hostile takeover would no longer result in a change in executive 
management. 
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Much of the discussion of “good governance” thinks that this knowledge is codifiable 
in the sense of being transmitted easily to the Board, or used as a basis for monitoring 
by the Board in its discussions of strategy. It is often supposed that by having 
independent or non-executive directors on the board, monitoring will help align 
incentives. But this leaves out of account the quality of the information that board 
members receive. While information deficiency is sometimes overstated e.g. the claim 
that intangibles are not represented in stock-market values (see Hall 1993, Tidd et al 
1996, Smit and Trigeorgis 2004) it is nevertheless correct that intangibles and options 
tend to be measured with a large margin of error.  An important research question is 
whether information deficiencies create an advantage for the “trustee manager” model 
over the “committed investor” in respect of risk-taking and decisionmaking. 
 
To some extent the information problem between shareholder representatives and 
managers might be resolved by new forms of social and environmental reporting 
(Roberts 2001). Furthermore, established managerial techniques such as the Balanced 
Scorecard (Kaplan and Norton 1996) or the lifecycle track record approach (Madden 
2007) can provide orderly information to Board members and monitoring committees, 
such as the audit committee.  Madden argues that short-termism would decrease and 
boards would compete in professionally monitoring all aspects of management 
performance if new metrics were developed that were capable of conveying genuine 
information on long-term value. He suggests that embryonic versions of these metrics 
are already contained in what security analysts do.   
 
Perhaps so, but even analysts’ information is poor compared with that of most 
corporate strategy units. And while contrarian investors can perhaps afford to play a 
close monitoring game, the (private) advantage of this would be diluted if it became 
general. Metrics may be useful if board members (especially institutional ones) have 
the aptitude and inclination to study metrics but it should be understood how much of 
a revolutionary change this would be in terms of time and commitment. Expert advice 
may be adequate for ex-post monitoring but it hardly squares with a role for strategic 
initiatives and forward planning (Donaldson 1997).25  
                                                 
25 It is not always recognised, even among economists, how far from the text-book model is the process 
of estimating the cost of capital and of planning investment and other forward commitments under 
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 It should also be borne in mind what the likely effect would be on executive 
management of control through targets and metrics. The implications of this are 
captured in the study by Roberts et al (2006) on the routines followed by executives in 
preparing for Board meetings. The executives: 
 
 “…come to transform themselves , their understanding and their actions in the 
images of the investor’s desires…Autonomy is realised not against but through 
meeting the demand for shareholder value” (Roberts et al 2006, p.287).26 
 
Thus, the “committed investor” model, even if could be established through 
legislation, would probably reduce managerial autonomy and have perverse effects on 
performance given the information gaps noted earlier. 
(ii) incentives for forward commitment 
In sections 3 and 4 it was suggested that short-termism was an inevitable product of 
the demand for liquidity that is part of shareholder orientation. This claim is often 
offset against the charge that stakeholder capitalism squanders resources for potential 
development due to rent seeking. In consequence, the market is starved of new 
resources that could be channelled to emergent start ups. There does seem to be some 
support for the overinvestment hypothesis for the US primary manufacturing sector 
(petrol refining and heavy metals) in the period before the hostile takeover boom of 
the 1980s. This sector experienced a subsequent sharp increase in capacity utilisation 
that may have indicated inefficiencies in production and rent-seeking (Driver and 
Shepherd 2005). Despite this, it does not appear that investment hurdle rates generally 
were kept low simply because of market power (Poterba and Summers 1995; Driver 
and Temple 2007). Thus, the evidence that managerial capitalism involves 
unacceptable levels of rent-seeking is at best unproven. 
 
To judge the extent to which capital allocation should be internal or external goes to 
the heart of corporate governance debate. The “pledgeable income” argument 
discussed in section 3 argued that shareholder control would facilitate finance. 
                                                                                                                                            
uncertainty. See for example the critiques of capital budgeting in  Jagannathan.and Meier (2002) and 
the discrepancy between realized and theoretical outcomes (Driver et al 2005).  
26 Perhaps this is one answer to “the problem of corporate governance” advanced by Lanonick (1992) 
as to why today’s managers lack “necessary incentive and ability” (p.32). 
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Against that it can be argued that financial allocation does not need to be done 
through a market in funds but can be managed internally. Roberts (2004) notes that 
UK firms have tended to become more diversified in recent years and that this does 
not appear to represent empire building. Other work suggests that hurdle rates below 
the cost of capital are no more likely for divisions within diversified companies as in 
free-standing ones, suggesting that cross-subsidisation, where it occurs, is not due to 
rent-seeking (Chevalier 2004) 27. There is thus little reason to favour external over 
internal transfer of resources. Indeed, internal reallocation, in the trustee manager 
mode, has the added benefits of internalising externalities and avoiding at least some 
transactions costs. 
 
.  
6. Conclusions 
All systems of governance are likely to be flawed in some respect. Governance 
implies that non-market forms of coordination are pressed into action to replace 
market forms that have failed Williamson (1999). And, as Gibbons (1999) puts it 
“Why should firms be oblivious to conditions that wreck markets?”(p.145). Any 
governance solution is likely to be best second-best and there will be trade-offs 
between them (Carlin and Mayer 2003). 
 
In this paper we have surveyed mechanisms by which governance might affect both 
current performance and forward commitments. The theory of the firm as currently 
expounded does not offer clear guidance on these issues. The most difficult issue to 
resolve when comparing forms of governance is what can or can not be taken as 
constant when comparing the systems. We therefore argued for a research programme 
on the dynamic effects of changes in governance form. 
 
When comparing the effects of governance systems on forward commitments, we 
found two useful ways of understanding the arguments for a stakeholder or 
shareholder perspective. First, adaptation theory, introduced by Simon over half a 
century ago, asks where power should lie in a Rawlsian perspective? Second, the idea 
                                                 
27 See also conflicting claims on rent-seeking and empire benefits in Hennessy and Levy (2002) and 
Aggarwal and Samwick (2006). 
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that governance influences the time-horizon for decisionmaking has underpinned 
much of the comment. In our review of recent US governance reforms we showed 
how they left untouched the problem of short-termism, which is a consequence of   
investors need for liquidity and imperfect signalling by management.  
 
If the traditional shareholder orientation is problematic, is it best reformed by more 
voice for institutional committed shareholders? The difficulties with this,  highlighted 
in our discussion on risk in section 5, is the quality of information. While some 
theories show that shareholder orientation is best for risk-taking,  the deterioration in 
information quality that accompanies a locus of power from insiders to outsiders may 
degrade the decision-making process. The information deficit of non-executive 
investors or board members is a formidable objection to reforms aimed at better 
governance though committed investment. The model of the “committed investor” 
thus seems to require two conditions that are currently lacking: non-opportunistic 
behaviour by fund boards – which, given the free-rider problem may need to be 
legislated for – and codifiable strategic information.   
 
The alternative reform  -  regression to managerial capitalism - is subject to separate 
critiques. Even if it were established that the appetite for forward commitments is 
enhanced in this mode, there remains the problem of opportunism that may have been 
increased by the recent focus on pecuniary incentives, targets, and executive tenure 
(Roberts 2001). Arguably, the extent of managerial opportunism is an outcome of 
processes and practices of accountability within the organisation that then influences  
the climate of trust or distrust that prevails. This again raises the question of what is 
held constant as the form of governance changes.  
 
It may be that a restoration of responsible managerial autonomy may best be achieved 
by supporting an increased monitoring role for investors as an ex-post process (Krafft 
and Ravix 2005). Information is easier to assess in retrospect; managers could be 
judged on the basis of a broad analysis of historical performance. Perhaps, this 
retrospective review process might create as a by-product a greater respect for the role 
of executive managers as creative strategists, thus reinforcing anew a tradition of the 
trustee manger. This could be allied with other reforms to enhance the value of 
managerial reputation and to protect weaker stakeholders from arbitrary power, 
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though the process is not simple (Kreps 1990). Arguably the process would require a 
reversal in the concentration of executive management power in a top hierarchy and a 
radical spreading of power downward in the organisation. 
 
While it is tempting to conclude that governance reform can thus take the best from 
both the system of “committed investor “ and “trustee manager”, this may turn out to 
be a mirage. Some aspects of the former model –  such as short term arbitrary targets 
linked to high-level pecuniary incentives – are seriously inimical to a creation of trust 
and autonomy. Only if institutional voice is restricted to ex-post monitoring offering a 
retrospective view over a reasonable time span is there likely to be a possible 
synthesis. 
 
Finally it may be of interest to finish this complex discussion with a short list of 
research questions.  
First, in contrasting the role of governance for current performance and forward 
commitments, which  role is more important? And is there a trade-off? 
Second,  which aspects of behaviour tend to hold constant when governance forms 
change?  And which are most subject to change? 
Third, and related to the second, of the many reasons why different parties are best 
placed to exercise residual control rights in an adaptation perspective, which ones 
matter most? 
Fourth, how much are hurdle rates for forward commitments (tangible or intangible) 
biased by governance orientation?  
Fifth, What is new theoretically, and what is unchanged, about referring the level of 
governance up one level to governance of the institutional investors themselves? 
Sixth, what variation is currently observed in managerial autonomy? In what pockets 
of the economy has it survived best and why? 
Seventh, and related to the sixth, how much of the firm’s strategic assets, position, and 
plans are codifiable in the sense of being packaged as metrics or forecasts? 
 
If, at the end of this paper, the rationale for these questions are clearer than at the 
outset, it will have served its purpose. 
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APPENDIX 1 
 
A simple model of the firm is proposed in Tirole (2001). If the manager foregoes 
private benefits B , revenue R   is generated with probablility  hp  and revenue 0 with 
probablility ( )1( hp− . Similarly, the manager receives formal compensation w  in the 
case of success (probability hp ) and zero for failure. Managers who decide to receive 
private benefits B , generate R  (and receive w ) with a lower probability of lp . Since 
the manager trades off the loss of private benefit B  with the differential probability 
times w , it must be the case that w  > )/( lh ppB − to provide incentives for 
managers. It follows that the maximum amount of available surplus (pledgeable 
income)  is ))/(( lhh ppBRp −− which must be greater than the cost of the project if 
the enterprise is raising all the capital. Under direct monitoring at cost c  the private 
benefits are reduced to b  and so the pledgeable income becomes 
cppbRp lhh −−− ))/(( . The result is that some positive NPV projects may not be 
funded, though that is less likely with low monitoring costs. 
 
An interesting elaboration then follows that allows managers to take profit enhancing 
actions that increases the probability of success by a flat increment τ    for both the 
low probability regime and the high probability regime so that )( lh pp −  is 
unaffected. Assume that the profit enhancing action (e.g. firing workers) is indeed 
welfare reducing with the private cost for the entrepreneur/other insiders higher than 
the gain in profits. If the entrepreneur retains control, the profit enhancing action is 
not taken and the pledgeable income remains constant at ))/(( lhh ppBRp −− . With 
relinquished control, the new pledgeable income is now  ))/()(( lhh ppBRp −−+τ  
which is bigger than before. This provides a potential argument for control rights to 
rest with the provider of finance, even though the result of the action is welfare 
reducing. Indeed, Tirole writes that this reasoning “provides us with a first argument 
in favour of shareholder value” (p.16). 
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